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Abstract 
Public bodies have no statutory duty to provide flood defences and do not have funds 
available to meet all requests for them.   This had led to recognition that flood 
prevention is not something to be left to others and there is now encouragement to 
householders to undertake “do it yourself” flood defence.   Such measures are not 
without risk of damage to other properties.   An investigation has therefore been 
undertaken to establish whether there is associated legal liability should such damage 
occur.   No cases have been published directly concerning liability for damage resulting 
from these activities.   However the Doctrine of Precedent declares that cases must be 
decided the same way when their material facts are the same.   Cases are identified 
which have relevant similar material facts, although not arising from modern “do it 
yourself” flood defence.   The ratio decidendi of cases concerning the receipt and 
passage of naturally flowing water, the increased passage of water to the property of 
others,  and the overtopping or failure of structures that have held back water is 
examined.   These cases are then discussed in the context of home flood defence.   It is 





There has been a tendency over the past century to expect flood defences to be provided 
by the Environment Agency and its predecessor bodies, and in some cases by local 
authorities or internal drainage boards.   However, although these bodies have had the 
power to provide defences, they have not had the duty to do so and have certainly not 
had funding to meet all requests for flood defence schemes.   There has therefore 
recently been: 
1. a recognition that flood defence is not something to be left to public agencies 
alone (House of Commons Select Committee on Agriculture, 1998, §90), 
and  
2. encouragement of householders to themselves become involved in flood 
defence of their properties (Environment Agency, 2001; DTLR, 2002). 
Bearing in mind the anecdotal advice frequently given to householders (Gray, 1995), 
but not investigated further here, that it may be best not to clear snow from the footpaths 
in front of their houses because of potential legal liabilities, an investigation has been 
made of case law to see whether such advice should extend to involvement in “do it 
yourself” flood defence. 
 
Individual Property Protection 
Following widespread flooding in autumn 2000, the House of Commons Select 
Committee on Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs (2000, §24) recommended 
that flood proof construction should be encouraged for use in developments in urban 
areas at risk of flooding and called for government advice to be issued including: 
• conditions on planning permissions; 
• incorporation into building regulations; and 
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• retrofitting of sustainable techniques into existing properties. 
In response to this recommendation two documents were issued by the Environment 
Agency (2001) and DTLR (2002).   They were reviewed in Wynn (2002).    
 
A further document (Environment Agency, 2003) provides guidance on the use of 
temporary free-standing barriers and removable items such as flood boards and air brick 
covers in the context of a new BSI Kitemark standard for such products.   The document 
is supported by advice sheets (CIRIA, 2003). 
 
The Risks of Providing Flood Defence 
The provision of a barrier against the free spread of water carries with it: 
• risks of increased flooding to properties upstream or downstream, and 
• the risk of sudden inundation if the barrier fails or is overwhelmed. 
The paper aims to establish whether there are legal liabilities associated with these risks.  
 
The Doctrine of Precedent declares that cases must be decided the same way when their 
material facts are the same (Williams, 1982).   The part of a case that sets the precedent 
is its ratio decidendi.   Williams says that this can be defined as the material facts plus 
the decision thereon.   Whilst there have not yet been any reported cases relating 
specifically to the effects of home flood defence, there have been cases spanning nearly 
three centuries concerning liability for flood damage to property as a consequence of 
work carried out on neighbouring land.   This paper seeks to identify the material facts 
of these cases and consider them in the new context of home flood defence provision. 
 
Page 3 
The paper does not consider statutory requirements such as the possible need to obtain 
land drainage consent.   Introductory guidance on these matters is contained, inter alia, 
in Environment Agency (2003). 
 
 
Receipt and Discharge of Naturally Flowing Water 
A legal distinction is made between water flowing within and outside of defined 
channels.   For the former it was established in the nineteenth century (Mason v Hill) 
that the owner of land upon the banks of a natural water course is both entitled and 
bound to accept the flow of water past or through his land.   He is not entitled to deprive 
those lower down the stream of its flow nor to pen it back upon the lands of his 
upstream neighbour.   The adjective “riparian” is used to describe the rights and duties 
arising from the ownership of land adjoining the banks or bed of a river. 
 
The relationship between the rights and duties of neighbours with respect to naturally 
flowing water outside of defined channels was considered in Home Brewery Co. Ltd. v 
William Davis & Co. (Leicester) Ltd.   The sole judge in the case identified a pair of 
questions of law to be decided: 
1. Does the owner or occupier of higher land have a right to discharge water 
percolating through or over his land onto lower lying land and is the owner 
or occupier of the lower lying land obliged to accept that water or is he 
entitled to prevent it entering his land? 
2. Could action taken by the owner or occupier of the lower land be held to 
have committed nuisance in carrying out operations that prevented the 
natural flow of water from the neighbouring higher ground? 
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The judge expressed surprise that this was the first time it was necessary for the English 
courts to consider the first question.   He concluded that “the lower occupier has no 
ground of complaint and no cause of action against the higher occupier for permitting 
the natural, unconcentrated flow of water, whether on or under the surface, to pass from 
the higher to the lower land, but that at the same time the lower occupier is under no 
obligation to receive it.   He may put up barriers, or otherwise pen it back, even though 
this may cause damage to a higher occupier.”   The judge stated that the right of the 
lower occupier to pen back the water is not absolute and went on to consider the related 
second question of law.   Here he established that there may be an action in nuisance if 
the lower occupier’s use of his land in taking preventive steps was unreasonable and 
that the resultant damage to the higher ground was reasonably foreseeable. 
 
A further important case concerning liability for mitigation of natural hazards is that of 
Leakey v National Trust.   This case concerned liability for landslip.   The court decided 
that there was a general duty on occupiers to do all that is reasonable in the 
circumstances to prevent or minimise the risk of foreseeable damage to the property of 
others from the encroachment of natural hazards from one’s land.   The relative 
financial and other resources of the parties was recognised in the judgment as a factor to 
be considered.   In this respect one of the judges illustrated the application of the 
principle with the resources that a small farmer might reasonably use to reduce the risk 
of flooding from a stream onto a more wealthy neighbour’s property as an example. 
In the case of Home Brewery Co. Ltd. v William Davis & Co. (Leicester) Ltd. the judge 
stated that his reading of  this example was that it applied “where a condition has 
occurred naturally on one person’s land which causes him little damage, but might 
cause his neighbour enormous damage and which would be expensive to remedy.”   In 
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the view of the current author it seems dangerous, and does not logically follow from 
Leakey v National Trust,  that a defendant’s liability to a plaintiff should be related to 
the size of the defendant’s own loss.   The individual nature of the Leakey test suggests 
that it is likely to keep the courts well occupied.   In the recent case of Green v Lord 
Somerleyton and others for example it was held that the duty existed but had not been 
breached. 
 
Increased Passage of Water to Other Property due to Flood Defences 
Case law involving defence against flooding from water flowing outside of defined 
channels has a relatively long history.   In the judgment on Farquharson v Farquharson 
(quoted within the later judgment on Gerrard v Crowe and another discussed below) it 
was stated that “It was found lawful for one to build a fence upon his own ground by the 
side of a river to prevent damage to his ground by the overflow of the river, though 
thereby a damage should happen to his neighbour by throwing the whole overflow in 
time of flood upon his ground, but it was found not lawful to use any operation in the 
alveus ”    
 
In Nield v London and North Western Railway Company, a river overflowed into a 
canal owned by the company.   The company placed a temporary barricade of planks to 
hold back the floodwater but this was outflanked and led to flooding of the plaintiff’s 
premises.   The decision was that the defendant company was not liable for the resulting 
damage, the judgment including the words “…the defendants in no sense brought the 
water, or caused it to come to the place where the damage happened, but that it came by 
natural causes, that is, by a heavy fall of rain, and the overflowing of the river, and the 
configuration of the country, the defendants had the right to protect themselves against 
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it, and the plaintiffs cannot complain although what the defendants did in so protecting 
themselves augmented the damage to them.” 
 
In Maxey Drainage Board v Great Northern Railway Company it was established that 
the railway company could legitimately construct an embankment to protect its land 
from such flooding, even though this caused flooding to other’s land, provided that they 
had “used reasonable care and skill and usual means for the purpose to do what was 
necessary to protect their land from damage by anticipated flood”.   A similar situation 
was considered by the Privy Council in Gerrard v Crowe, the outcome of which was 
that there was no liability towards the landowner who suffered greater flooding as the 
result of an embankment constructed by the defendants.   The judgment in this case 
carefully distinguished it from the earlier case of Menzies v Earl of Breadalbane which 
had shown that a riparian owner cannot lawfully carry out works that obstruct a natural 
channel with resulting encroachment of the channel onto other’s land.   In Marriage v 
East Norfolk Rivers Catchment Board LJ Jenkins states “I think it must be regarded as 
settled that, to be actionable, an erection must be shown to obstruct a defined channel 
through which flood water is accustomed to flow, and not merely to prevent flood water 
from flowing at large over land adjoining the river and thence back into the main 
stream, although this may be the course where the flood water is accustomed to take.” 
 
Failure of Defences 
The possibility of overtopping by water levels higher than the height of defences is 
perhaps the mode of failure that would immediately come to mind. 
A number of cases have examined liability for overtopping of structures provided as, or 
acting as, flood defences.   In Whalley v Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company, 
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flooding caused the railway embankment to act as a temporary flood barrier.   Fearing 
for the stability of the embankment the company cut trenches through it allowing 
flooding of land on the other side of the embankment.   The Court of Appeal decided 
that the company had no right to protect their property by transferring the mischief from 
their own land to that of the plaintiff. 
 
In Hudson v Tabor, where the parties owned adjoining properties with a continuous 
flood defence wall running along the riverward edge, it was held that, in the absence of 
evidence of any prescriptive duty, there was no common law duty to maintain the height 
of sections of the wall for the protection of adjoining landowners. 
 
The final case to be considered, Adcock v Norfolk Line Ltd. is one of negligence.   The 
case concerned the defective construction of a temporary sandbag flood defence whose 
breach led to 99 claims from property owners who suffered flood damage of about £1 
million in total.   Negligence was proved in the design, direction, construction, 
supervision, inspection and maintenance of the work, with the regional water authority 
(who then had equivalent powers and duties to those now held by the Environment 
Agency) and the sub-contractor (who was effectively working under the direction of the 
water authority) being apportioned most of the liability. 
 
Discussion of Case Law in Relation to Home Flood Defence 
It is unlikely that a householder will attempt to divert the natural channel of a river as 
was the subject of the Farquharson v Farquharson case.   Such work would today 
require the consent of the appropriate land drainage body which would not be 
forthcoming without thorough investigation of the likely consequences.   The cases of 
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Nield v London and North Western Railway Company, Maxey Drainage Board v Great 
Northern Railway Company and Gerrard v Crowe have established that it is acceptable 
to protect one’s own property against flooding even though this may increase the flood 
threat to others.   In practice the increased risk to others from the action of defending a 
single property will generally be minimal.   However this may not be so in the case of 
defences installed to protect groups of houses, a possibility envisaged in Environment 
Agency (2003).   In spite of the apparent precedents just described, that document points 
out that the right to take measures against flooding needs to be balanced against 
ensuring the action taken does not significantly increase the risk of flooding to other 
properties. 
 
Whilst self interest ought to ensure that all co-operate, of particular relevance to the 
situation where defences are installed to collectively protect groups of properties is 
Hudson v Tabor which established that there is no obligation on all owners and 
occupiers to maintain their share of the defences.   The case of Whalley v Lancashire 
and Yorkshire Railway Company warns that emergency conditions may not be sufficient 
reason for removal of barriers.   However it could be argued here that, if imminent 
collapse of the defence system is likely, controlled discharge may be preferable to 
sudden collapse.   Claims for negligence are most likely to occur in situations where 
group protection is involved.   The risk of flooding leading to such claims can be 
minimised by ensuring that only kite marked products are installed and that 
manufacturers’ instructions for their use are followed.   Adcock v Norfolk Line Ltd. is a 
salutary lesson that even experts can be found wanting in the basic task of constructing 




Common law gives reasonable legal protection to those who need to prevent flooding of 
their properties.   The courts have established that such activities can be carried out 
without fear of liability for nuisance, even though the risk to others may be increased as 
a result.   There is no liability in nuisance to other members where protection is 
provided on a group basis.   The use of kite marked flood protection products in 
accordance with manufacturers’ instructions reduces the chances of negligence.   
Bearing in mind the risk to one’s own property if the measures are not carried out, it is 
perhaps legally safer to partake in “do it yourself” flood defence than snow clearing! 
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